The prevailing view in policy circles is that landlockedness is bad for development because it reduces trade. This paper shows that other channels of transmission are likely to be important and, possibly, quantitatively larger and statistically stronger than the trade channel. One such channel is the quality of institutions. Using a system of structural equations and different estimators, the paper finds that landlockedness negatively affects the quality of institutions, which is in turn a fundamental determinant of per-capita income. By comparison, the evidence in support of the trade channel is surprisingly mild.
The curse of being landlocked:
institutions rather than trade
Introduction
This paper presents some new evidence on the development impact of the landlocked geographic status. The prevailing view in policy circles is that being landlocked causes a disadvantage in development because it makes trade more di¢ cult and costly. However, the story might actually be more articulated than that. For one thing, this policy view is predicated on empirical evidence that is more controversial than what appears at …rst sight.
For another, the isolation associated with being landlocked can a¤ect economic development through channels other than international trade integration. In light of these objections, the paper reconsiders the relationship between development and landlockedness from an empirical perspective using a system of equations to assess the relative importance of two di¤erent transmission channels: one is trade integration and the other is institutional quality. It turns out that the institutional channel is indeed statistically strong and economically relevant, while the evidence in support of the trade channel is surprisingly mild.
The idea that landlocked countries deserve special attention is rather well consolidated in the profession. For instance, Joyce (2005) shows that the duration of IMF programmes is extended for landlocked countries compared to coastal countries with similar economic and institutional characteristics. More generally, Collier (2008) argues that the landlocked status is one of the four key factors preventing the poorest countries from growing and ripping o¤ the bene…ts of globalization. The question is then why is landlockedness such a tough development challenge? The conventional answer to this question draws on evidence from gravity models and growth regressions. Gravity models point to a strong negative e¤ect of landlockedness on bilateral trade ‡ows (see, inter alia, Limao and Venables, 2001; Rose, 2002; Raballand, 2003; Martinez-Zarzoso and Marquez-Ramos, 2005; Coulibaly and Fontagne, 2006) 1 . At the same time, some growth regressions report a positive e¤ect of trade openness (generally measured as the share of international trade in GDP) on the rate of GDP growth (see Frankel and Romer, 1999 and Dollar and Kraay, 2004 for two well-known examples). Combining these two pieces of evidence one can then conclude that landlockedness is bad for growth (and hence development) because it reduces international trade.
There are three possible objections to this conclusion. First, the statistical strength and robustness of the relationship between growth and trade openness is a controversial matter. Levine and Renelt (1992) …nd that openness to trade is not robustly correlated with growth, but it is correlated with the investment rate (which is in turn a robust determinant of growth). Fernandez et al. (2001) conclude that the number of years an economy has been open to international trade is one of the robust determinants of growth, but the economy's overall degree of outward orientation is not. Similarly, Hoover and Perez (2004) , Hendry and Krolzig (2004), and Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) …nd growth to be robustly correlated with the years of openness, but not with the international trade share of GDP. Rodrik et al. (2004) show that once institutional quality is controlled for, measures of trade openness are insigni…cant in income regressions, although trade might be a signi…cant determinant of institutional quality. So, landlockedness might determine trade, but it is unclear whether trade actually matters for growth.
Second, it is even questionable that landlockedness determines trade openess. Consider these simple stylized facts. The dataset which will be used for estimation in this paper consists of cross-sectional observations for 150 countries over the period . In a regression of the average trade/GDP share on a constant and a dummy for landlocked countries, the estimated coe¢ cient of the dummy is -1.721 with a standard error of 7.945.
That is, the coe¢ cient has the "right" sign, but it is largely insigni…cant (p-value is above 0.8). If the trade share is log-transformed, then the estimated coe¢ cient of the dummy becomes positive and the associated p-value grows to 0.9. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient of the landlocked dummy is not di¤erent from zero (p-value above 0.7) even when trade is measured by the predicted trade shares of Frankel and Romer (1999) , which are constructed from a gravity model where landlockedness is strongly signi…cant. Lastly, in a regression of the number of years of trade openness, the coe¢ cient of the landlocked dummy is -0.121, but again it does not pass the zero restriction test at usual con…dence level, although the p-value is only marginally larger than 0.1. Hence, the fact that landlockedness signi…cantly reduces bilateral trade ‡ows in gravity models does not automatically imply that it also reduces trade openness.
Third, when landlockedness is directly included on the right hand side of growth or income regressions, results are once again ambiguous. On the one hand, a negative e¤ect of the landlocked status or a positive e¤ect of coastline length on income/growth is reported by Bloom and Sachs (1998) , Masters and Sachs (2001) , Easterly and Levine (2003) , Bloom et al, (2003) , and Bosker and Garretsen (2009) . On the other hand, Sala-i- Martin et al. (2004) conclude that a landlocked dummy variable is not robustly partially correlated with growth,
while Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Rodrik et al. (2004) show that being landlocked does not signi…cantly a¤ect the level of per-capita income after controlling for institutional quality.
In a number of other papers (i.e. Acemoglu et al. 2002; Sachs, 2003; Bleaney and Dimico, 2010 ) the strength and statistical signi…cance of the e¤ect of landlockedness on income or growth is sensitive to model speci…cation, estimation methodology, and sample selection 2 .
These objections to the prevailing view create scope for further investigation of the development e¤ects of landlockedness. Two distinctive features characterize the analysis in this paper. One is the focus on levels of per-capita income instead of growth rates. As noted by Hall and Jones (1999) , levels capture the di¤erences in long-run economic performance that are most directly relevant to welfare. Furthermore, the low persistence of growth rates over time means that cross-country di¤erences in growth rates are mostly transitory and hence that long-run di¤erences in levels are the interesting fact to explain. Finally, results from a growth regression where the dependent variable is measured over a few decades might be misleading: if landlockedness historically depresses growth, but for some reason this negative e¤ect has weakened (or even reversed) in the last few decades, then the growth regression might return a non-signi…cant (or even positive) coe¢ cient that is not representative of the true underlying relationship 3 .
The other distinctive feature of this paper is that it does not restrict landlockedness to a¤ect income only through its e¤ect on trade openness. This is because the landlocked status is likely to impact on determinants of per-capita income other than trade and economic integration. For instance, geographic isolation can in ‡uence the degree to which the population is exposed to other cultures, religions, and ideas coming from the rest of the world.
It can also a¤ect the pattern of colonization a country was subject to and/or the incidence 2 See also Henderson et al. (2001) for a survey of earlier research on the impact of landlockedness on economic performance. There are of course several papers that look at the e¤ects of the landlocked status on other economic aspects. For instance, Oshawa and Koshizuka (2003) study the impact of the landlocked status on the extent of …scal competition among countries. Shatz (2004) Any income e¤ect that might operate through the in ‡uence of landlockedness on cultural values would be then incorporated into this residual e¤ect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the modelling strategy.
Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains the variables de…nition, the list of data sources, and some summary statistics.
Modelling strategy
In the econometric model, landlockedness is allowed to a¤ect per-capita income through its e¤ect on both trade openness and institutional quality. Furthermore, landlockedness is also allowed to have a residual e¤ect on per-capita income after accounting for the transmission via openness and institutions. The set of structural relationships can then be written as follows:
where i denotes a generic country in the sample, y, q, and t denote per-capita income, institutional quality, and trade openness respectively, x, z, and w are set of control variables in each equation, l denotes the landlocked status, ", , and are error terms, and 0 s, 0 s, 0 s, a, b, and c are coe¢ cients to be estimated.
Equation (1) The set of controls includes latitude and a dummy variable for oil rich countries. Equation In equation (3), the e¤ect of the landlocked status on trade openness is represented by the coe¢ cient 1 . The set of controls follows from the argument of Frankel and Romer (1999) and includes two measures of the size of the country (geographic area and total population) and the oil rich country dummy to re ‡ect the greater tendency to trade of oil exporters. The aggregate e¤ect of landlockedness on income is thus given by the term
The estimation of this econometric model can proceed in di¤erent ways depending on whether (i) the error terms are correlated across equations and ( (1), there is potential for reverse causality and hence institutional quality and trade might be endogenous. This potential endogeneity could be attenuated, but not necessarily eliminated, if per-capita income is measured at the end of the period while institutional quality and trade are measured as averages over the entire sample period.
All in all, it is probably best to take a pragmatic approach and use all of the four estimators. For the purpose of presentation, the single equation estimators are reported in the Appendix. However results turn out to be quite robust across di¤erent estimators. In 2SLS and 3SLS, institutional quality and trade in equation (1) are treated as endogenous.
Instruments are generated from the exclusion restrictions incorporated in the speci…cation of the set of controls x, z, and w: The full set of excluded instruments for equation (1) therefore includes: malaria ecology, ethnic fragmentation, the legal origin dummies, the size of population, and land area. There are instead no excluded instruments in the other two equations because none of the regressors appears to be endogenous. This measure has two advantages over other indicators of institutional quality that have been used in previous work. First, it is objective rather than subjective. Second, it can be computed for a large number of countries over a long period of time. Incidentally, its correlation with other institutional quality measures (such as those used by Acemoglu et al.,
2001
; Rodrik et al., 2004; and Glaeser et al., 2004 ) is generally positive and very high, albeit smaller than one. Trade is de…ned as the period average ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. Landlockedness is a dummy variable taking value 1 if country i is landlocked and zero otherwise. Latitude is simply measured as country's distance from the equator. Malaria ecology is an index that combines temperature, mosquito abundance, and mosquito vectors into an ecologically-based measure of malaria risk. Ethnic fragmentation is the probability that two randomly selected individuals do not belong to the same ethnic group. Legal origins are captured by a set of four dummies, each representing a speci…c origin of the legal system (UK, Scandinavian, German, Socialist). Total population and land area are log transformed.
The oil dummy takes value 1 if country i is oil rich and zero otherwise. Further details on variables de…nition and sources are provided in the Appendix.
Results
Results are separately presented for the SUR and the 3SLS estimators. The results from the single equation estimators (OLS and 2SLS) are reported in the Appendix. Table 1 reports the SUR estimates of equations (1), (2), and (3). As noted, the SUR estimator allows for non-zero correlations in errors across equations, but also assumes that all regressors are exogenous. While this assumption might not hold for equation (1), the SUR estimates still provide a useful benchmark.
SUR (and OLS) estimates

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
To start with, consider the estimates reported in the …rst three columns of the table: column I is the income equation (1), column II is the institutional quality equation (2), and column III is the trade equation (3). The key …nding is that the e¤ect of landlockedness on income is transmitted through institutional quality rather than trade. Being landlocked lowers the quality of institutions. At the same time, better institutions increase per-capita income. Therefore, landlockedness reduces per-capita income through its negative e¤ect on institutions. Conversely, there is little evidence of transmission through trade. The coe¢ -cient of the trade variable in the income equation is positive and signi…cant, albeit at the 10% con…dence level only, meaning that greater openness to international trade increases per-capita income. However, the negative e¤ect of landlockedness on trade openness is negligible in statistical terms, as it was already suggested by the stylized facts discussed in the Introduction. Hence, it is not by reducing openness to international trade that landlockedness a¤ects income.
The second interesting piece of evidence is that even after controlling for the e¤ect through institutional quality, landlockedness has a residual negative e¤ect on per-capita income. As discussed, this residual e¤ect might incorporate the adverse impact of the landlocked status on proximate determinants of income and/or cultural values.
Turning to the other controls, latitude has a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cients in the income equation. This means that geography does matter, and not just because of the landlocked status. The oil dummy also has a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient, meaning that natural resources in the long term are a blessing rather than a curse. In the institutional equation, malaria ecology and some of the legal origin dummies are signi…cant, while neither oil abundance nor ethnic fragmentation seem to be relevant. Finally, country size, measured in terms of both population and land area, appears to be the main driver of international trade openness.
In the …rst three columns, the system is estimated on a total of 104 countries 7 . This sample includes economies at all stages of development. In order to check whether results are strongly a¤ected by the inclusion of the most advanced economies, columns IV, V, and VI report SUR estimates for a subsample of economies whose per-capita income at the beginning of the sample period was lower than US$ 10000 8 . As can be seen, results are qualitatively the same. In particular, the evidence concerning the impact of the landlocked status is very similar to what emerges from the …rst three columns. The only relevant di¤erence is that in this sub-sample, the coe¢ cient of the oil dummy in the income equation is no longer signi…cant, while instead it was positive and signi…cant in the full sample estimates. So, it appears that once the most advanced economies are excluded, oil abundance ceases to be a driver of development. However, even in this case, it does not appear to be a curse, in the sense that it does not signi…cantly reduce per-capita income.
As a further sensitivity check, the model has been re-estimated with a slight, but important, twist in equation (2) Table 1 . The only important di¤erence is that the coe¢ cient of landlockedness turns insigni…cant in the income equation. That is, in this speci…c subsample, there is no longer evidence of a signi…cant residual e¤ect of landlockedness on income after controlling for the transmission through institutional quality.
Finally, Table A1 in the Appendix reports the results from the OLS estimator, which di¤ers from the SUR estimator because it assumes zero correlation across errors. Results are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
3SLS (and 2SLS) estimates
Estimates from 3SLS are reported in Table 2 . With this estimator, errors are allowed to be cross-correlated across equation and institutional quality and trade in equation (1) are treated as endogenous. The full set of instruments arising from the exclusion restrictions presented in Section 2 is used. Similarly to Table 1 , the …rst three columns of Table 2 show the estimates for the full sample of all countries while the next three columns present the results for the restricted sample which excludes the richest economies.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
It is immediately evident that for the institutional and the trade equation results are very similar to those reported in Table 1 . This is hardly surprising given that in those two equations all variables are exogenous. Some di¤erences from Table 2 instead arise with respect to the income equation. In particular, the estimated coe¢ cient of the trade variable is no longer signi…cant. This con…rms the lack of relevance of the trade channel:
not only landlockedness has a negligible e¤ect on overall trade openness, but trade openness does not evan appear to be a signi…cant determinant of income. The results concerning the other determinants of per-capita income are instead con…rmed, including the existence of a residual negative e¤ect of the landlocked status on income after controlling for the transmission through institutional quality. In fact, the lack of relevance of some instruments does not come as a surprise. The full set of instruments does include some variables that are not strongly correlated with the regressors they are supposed to instrument. In particular, the estimates from equation (2) suggest that ethnic fragmentation and some of the legal origin variables are not signi…cantly correlated with institutional quality. This consideration suggests re-estimating the model using as excluded instruments in equation (1) only those variables that are most strongly correlated with institutional quality and trade in equations (2) and (3) respectively. This means instrumenting institutional quality by malaria ecology only and trade openness by population and land area.
The 3SLS estimates obtained from this selected set of instruments are presented in Table   3 . The corresponding 2SLS estimates are shown in Table A3 . Both tables report, as usual, full sample estimates in the …rst three columns and restricted sample estimates in the next three columns.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The evidence on the institutional quality channel is still quite strong and signi…cant:
landlockedness negatively a¤ects institutions and worse institutions in turn reduce per-capita 9 Diagnostics are reported for the income equation only as this is the only equation where instruments are used.
income. The weakness of the trade channel is also con…rmed: the negative e¤ect of landlockedness on trade openness is statistically negligible and the impact of trade openness on per-capita income is, again, not di¤erent from zero in statistical terms. The residual e¤ect of landlockedness on income remains negative, but with the 3SLS estimator the coe¢ cient fails to be signi…cant in the restricted sample. All the other results are qualitatively the same as those shown in Table 2 . The diagnostics tests from the 2SLS regressions in Table A3 are now more satisfactory. In particular, the weak identi…cation test statistic is well above the Stock and Yogo's critical value and the null hypothesis of the test of overidentifying restrictions can never be rejected. Overall, the tests indicate that these selected instruments are both relevant and exogenous.
According to the estimates in Table 3 , the per-capita income of the median landlocked economy should be approximately 55% of the per-capita income of the median coastal economy, after controlling for all other income determinants. In the full sample of all countries, the income of the median landlocked economy is US$ 2627 and the income of the median coastal economy is US$7944. Therefore, the estimated e¤ect of landlockedness explains about 2/3 of the actual di¤erence between median landlocked and median coastal economy (the explained proportion grows to 70% when using the restricted sample without the richest economies). The implied monetary cost of being landlocked is large: evaluated at the median per-capita income of coastal economies, this cost is US$ 3574 per-capita or, equivalently, approximately 1.3 times the actual per-capita income of the medial landlocked economy.
Conclusions
The prevailing view in policy circles is that landlockedness is bad for development because of its adverse e¤ects on trade. In fact, gravity models generally indicate that the landlocked status reduces bilateral trade ‡ows. Yet, this might not be enough to conclude that trade is the main channel of transmission of the development e¤ects of landlockedness. First of all, the evidence on the income or growth e¤ects of trade is controversial. Second, the correlation between landlockedness and trade seems to disappear once trade is measured in proportion of total GDP. Third, a number of recent empirical papers …nd landlockedness not to be signi…cantly related to per-capita income or growth.
Against this background, the paper revisits and extends the evidence on the relationship between development and landlocked status. Development is here measured by the level of per-capita GDP. The landlocked status is allowed to a¤ect per-capita income not just through trade, but also through its e¤ect on institutional quality. A residual e¤ect is also accounted for, which might pick the impact of landlockedness on proximate determinants of income (like human and physical capital or technology) and/or on cultural values. Estimates of a structural model of three equations indicate that: (i) institutional quality rather than trade openness seems to be the main channel of transmission of the e¤ect of landlockedness and (ii) there is a negative residual e¤ect of landlockedness on income after controlling for the transmission through institutional quality (and trade). These …ndings are generally robust to the use of di¤erent estimators and to the exclusion of the most advanced economies from the sample.
The results presented in this paper are not meant to neglect the obstacles that landlocked countries face in integrating into the world economy. In this regard, the initiatives for trade facilitation that characterize international assistance to landlocked countries are still important and welcome. What the paper, however, shows is that the development impact of the landlocked status is not limited to trade e¤ects. Other transmission mechanisms are at work and the monetary costs associated with these mechanisms is large. The adverse e¤ect of landlockedness on the quality of institutions is one such mechanism. It is important for policymakers to recognize the existence and relevance of these other mechanisms in order to accompany trade facilitation with other policies and reforms that can help boost the development prospects of landlocked countries.
Finally, this paper opens up some potentially interesting avenues of future research. One concerns the apparent clash between the …ndings from gravity models and the evidence reported here that landlockedness is not correlated to openness to international trade. A tentative explanation, which would be consistent with the other results of the paper, is that landlockedness separately a¤ects both the numerator and the denominator of the trade to GDP ratio. The e¤ect on the numerator is what emerges from gravity models. The e¤ect on the denominator would arise, for given population size, from the negative impact of landlockedness on income via institutions (or channels other than trade). If the two e¤ects are of roughly the same magnitude, then landlockedness reduces bilateral trade ‡ows without a¤ecting overall trade openness.
Another avenue of research is to experiment with di¤erent measures of access to the sea.
Here, the landlocked status is simply captured by a dummy variable. However, di¤erent countries can be landlocked to a di¤erent extent. To capture these di¤erences, slightly more sophisticated measures could be used, such as the proportion of population living within 100 km from the coast or the distance from the nearest port. Finally, it will be interesting to investigate the spatial dimension of the e¤ect of landlockedness. This means allowing the coe¢ cient of the landlocked measure to vary depending on certain characteristics (e.g. quality of institutions or density of transport infrastructures) of the transit economies. 
Equation-by-equation estimation results
The tables with the OLS and 2SLS results mentioned in the text are reported below. The structure of the tables is the same as in the text: the …rst three columns report full sample estimates and the next three columns report estimates from the restricted sample (i.e. the sample that excludes the richest economies).
The 2SLS estimates are completed by the diagnostic tests to assess the validity of the instruments. The test of underidenti…cation is an LM test of the null hypothesis that the matrix of reduced form coe¢ cients on the excluded instruments has rank equal to k 1, where k is the number of endogenous regressors. A rejection of this null hypothesis indicates that the matrix is full rank and hence that the model is identi…ed. The test of weak identi…cation is an F version of the Cragg and Donald (1993) Wald statistic for underidenti…cation and is discussed in Stock and Yogo (2005) . Under the null hypothesis, the estimator is weakly identi…ed. The test of overidentifying restrictions is based on the Sargan statistic. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
INSERT TABLES A1, A2, A3 ABOUT HERE The endogenous variables in the income equation are instrumented by malaria ecology, log population and log area. *, **, *** denote statistical signi…cance at usual con…dence levels. 
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